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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent, Joleen L. Scheller, concurs with the Statement 
of Facts as presented by the Respondent, but submits the 
following additional facts which are pertinent to this case. 
That Joleen L. Scheller, mother of William "Billy Joe" 
Scheller, cared for her son in her own home,and in the home of 
her mother during the entire lifetime of the child. That Michael 
Pessetto, did not ever see the child or have any relationship 
with him during the entire lifetime of the child. (Michael 
Pessetto's deposition of May, 19, 1987, Page 16 - 17). There 
were contacts between Joleen L. Sheller and Michael Pessetto at 
the time of the paternity hearing on or about May 24, 1983, at 
Ogden, Utah, but Michael Pessetto made no effort at that time to 
ask where the mother and child were living, how the child was, 
where he could find the child or how he could visit the child. 
(See Transcript of Proceedings of October 16, 1987, pages 1 & 2, 
Case No 16434; and Findings of Fact dtd. November 3, 1987, 
paragraphs 4. & 5. ) 
The Trial Court found that Mr. Pessetto did not refuse to 
support the child. He paid what he had to pay and was forced to 
pay by the court, and he did absolutely nothing beyond that. 
(See Transcript of Proceedings of October 16, 1987,page 1, Case 
No. 16434; and Findings of Fact dated November 3, 1987, 
paragraph 3.). Michael Pessetto did not make an effort to visit 
his son, did not send cards or gifts to a last known address, nor 
did he inquire as to the well-being of his child at "some point". 
(See Transcript of Proceedings of October 16, 1987, page 1, Case 
1 
No. 16434; and Findings of Fact dtd. November 3, 1987, Paragraphs 
4. , 5., & 6. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 75-2-109(1) (b) (ii) of Utah Code Annotated recognizes 
the reality that mothers and fathers of children born out of 
wedlock are not similarly situated. The statute discriminates in 
a legitimate manner between a father who openly treats an 
illegitimate child as his and a father who does not openly treat 
an illegitimate child as his. The statute does not violate 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution or the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The statute creates a classification based upon gender, 
which classification serves and is substantially related to the 
important governmental objective of providing for a fair and 
efficient manner of inheritance from a child born out of wedlock, 
by ensuring that such inheritance is received by a parent who has 
actually had some participation in the nurturing of the deceased 
child during its lifetime. The statute passes the constitutional 
muster of the intermediate level of scrutiny applied by the 
courts. 
The statute is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution under the Equal Protection Clause 
or the Due Process Clause in that it permits different treatment 
of an unmarried mother and an unmarried father, recognizing that 
they are not similarly situated. It reasonably requires the 
father to evidence some degree of interest and commitment to the 
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child in order for him to acquire a right of the stature eligible 
for constitutional protection. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 75-2-109(1) (b) (ii) DOES NOT 
VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, OF SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY 
PROVIDING A DIFFERENT CRITERIA FOR MOTHERS THAN FOR FATHERS TO 
INHERIT THROUGH THEIR DECEASED CHILD. 
It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause of 
Article IV, of Section 1, of the Utah Constitution protects 
against discrimination when legislation provides dissimilar 
treatment for individuals who are similarly situated. Malan B. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 62 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court have both held that certain 
classifications based upon sex are invalid under equal protection 
analysis. R£ ed v^ R ee cl 404 U.S. 71 (1971); £jr orijt _i _§£ o v^_ 
Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Pusey y^_ Pusey 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 
1986). "Underlying these decisions is the principal that a state 
is not free to make overbroad generalizations based on sex which 
are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women 
or which demean the ability or social status of the affected 
class." Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979). It is only 
under those situations wherein a statute provides dissimilar 
treatment as between men and women who are similarly situated 
that the equal protection clauses of both the Utah State 
Constitution and the United Sates Constitution are violated. 
A. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 75-2-109 (l)(b)(ii) IS NOT 
DISCRIMINATORY BY GENDER ON ITS FACE. 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have noted that in situations in which men and women are not 
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similarly situated, and a statutory classification is 
realistically based upon the differences in their situations, the 
statutory classification creates no gender-based discrimination. 
See e.g., Parham v. Hughes, Supra; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
2 48 (1983); Schlesinger y^ Ballard 419 U.S. 498 (1975); see also 
Ellis v. Social Service Department of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980); Redwood Gym y^ 
Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981). 
B. THE SUBJECT STATUTE'S GENDER DISTINCTIONS ARE 
RATIONAL AND REALISTIC, AND NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant erroneously argues that once the father has been 
adjudicated to be a parent of the child, that commencing at that 
moment the mother and the father are similarly situated, and that 
without any further requirement on the part of the father, he 
should inherit equally with the mother of the child. The father 
Michael Pessetto, reaches this conclusion in a conclusory manner 
without citation of any direct authority to support such view. 
The cited Utah Statute does not create a gender based 
classifaction at all, but it merely discriminates in a legitimate 
manner between a father who openly treats an illegitimate child 
as his and a father who does not openly treat an illegitimate 
child as his. 
The mere adjudication under a State initiated paternity 
proceeding, as in the instant case, that the father is the parent 
of the child born to the mother does not make the father 
similarly situated with the mother from the time of adjudication 
forward. 
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young women 
and young men are not similarly situated with respect to the 
problems and risk each incurs from sexual intercourse outside of 
the marital relationship. Only women may become pregnant, and 
they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional 
and psychological consequences of such sexual acitivity. The 
mother, by virtue of her pregnancy is automatically responsible 
for the child; she has the burdens and responsibilities of the 
pregnancy. She may choose to abort the child, or she may carry 
it full term. She is subject to any social stigmas against her 
during the pregnancy term by reason of her visible physical 
state. In short, the mother of a child has from conception a 
nurturing relationship and commitment to the child, which events 
after birth cannot alter. The role of the mother in carrying the 
child and giving birth thus alone establish a bond of 
relationship with the child which validly supports the 
legislative distinctions expressed in the subject statute. 
On the other hand the biological father is not automatically 
responsible for the child. He may not have an interest in 
legitimating the child. In most cases, he can wait until after 
the child is born before committing himself, even to the point of 
awaiting State action against him before making any committment. 
During this time while the unmarried pregnant female is trying to 
determine what she will do with the child, and how she will care 
for and properly support the child, if she elects to keep it, the 
father is totally free from any responsibility with respect to 
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the child or the mother. To classify him as a parent entitled to 
receive an inheritance from his deceased child, as in the case 
now before the court, absent any relationship with the child from 
date of birth to date of death, would constitute a windfall that 
makes no social or legal sense. The constitution protects only 
parent-child relationships of a father who has actually made 
some open commitments towards an association with the child. 
The cited provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code that: 
"....the paternity established under this sub-section, 
(l)(b)(n), is ineffective to qualify the father or his 
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the 
father has openly treatd the child as his and has not 
refused to support the child." (Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
75-2-109 (l)(b)(n).) 
in no manner violates the constitutional rights of a male 
adjudicated to be the parent of the child in respect to his right 
of inheritance from the child. 
The hypothetical case situation presented by the Appellant 
and quoted as follows: 
"The result being that if both the mother and the 
father were to abandon a child immediately after birth, 
the mother could recover automatically, yet the father 
could not. The only basis for making this distinction is 
that of gender" (Appellant's Brief, page 9) 
is based upon the false assumption that once the father has been 
adjudicated a parent that both the mother and father have at once 
become similarly situated, which premise is clearly erroneous. 
In M ichael M. vs. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 4 50 US 
464,(1981), The United States Supreme Court, upheld the 
constitutionality of a California statutory rape law under which 
men alone were held criminally liable for the act of sexual 
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intercourse, as nonviolative of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendendment, and declared at pages 468 and 469 of the 
opinion as follows: 
"But because the Equal Protection Clause does not 
'demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all 
persons' or require 'things which are different in 
fact... to be treated in law as though they were the 
same.' Rinaldi vs. Yeager 384 US 305,309, 16 L Ed 2d 
577, 86 S Ct 1497 (1966), quoting Tiqner v Texas, 310 
US 141, 147, 84 L Ed 1124, 60 S Ct 879, 130 ALR 1321 
(1940), this Court has consistently upheld statutes 
where the gender classification is not invidious, but 
rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes 
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. 
Parham _v Hughes, supra; Califano v Webster, 430 US 313, 
51 L Ed 2d 360, 97 S Ct 1192 (1977); Schlesinger v 
Ballard, 419 US 498, 42 L Ed 2d 610, 95 S Ct 572, 9 3NA 
FEP Cas 33 (1975); Kahn v Shevin, 416 US 351,40 L Ed 
2d 189, 94 S Ct 1734 (1974). As the Court has stated, a 
legislature may 'provide for the special problems of 
women.' Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 653, 43 L 
Ed 2d 514, 95 S Ct 1225 (1975)." 
The case which most closely coincides with the instant case 
is the United States Supreme Court Case of Parham v. Hughes, 
Supra, which involved a Georgia statutory provision which 
determined which parties were entitled to bring a wrongful action 
upon the death of an illegitimate child. Under the Georgia code, 
a mother of a legitimate or illegitimate child was always 
entitled to bring a wrongful death action without further 
qualification, but the father of a child could only bring a 
wrongful death action if the child was legitimate and if the 
mother had died. The effect of the statute was to require the 
father of an illegitimate child to officially legitimatize the 
child prior to the death of the child before he could bring a 
wrongful death action. 
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In Parhamf the biological father of the boy, who died in an 
automobile accident with his mother, attempted to bring a 
wrongful death action to recover for the boy's death. The father 
had signed the child's birth certificate, contributed to his 
support, given the child his last name, and visited the child on 
a regular basis, but he had never taken the additional step of 
officially legitimatizing the child. Because of this latter 
factor, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia 
Supreme Court ruling which held that the father was not a proper 
party to bring a wrongful death action. The court rejected the 
father's claim that the statutory provision created a gender-
based classification, holding squarely that: 
"(t)he fact is that mothers and fathers of illegitimate 
children are not similarly situated." (441 U.S. at 355.) 
Noting that the father had the ability to take action to 
establish his rights as a father, the court concluded: 
"Thus, the conferral of the right of a natural 
father to sue for the wrongful death of his child only 
if he has previously acted to identify himself, 
undertake his paternal responsibilities, and make his 
child legitimate, does not. JL§j[,1 e?c:t. a.riy; ^ yejrb^oad 
generalizations about men ajs a, class, but rather the 
reality that in Georgia only a father can by unilateral 
action legitimate an illegitimate child. Since fathers 
who do legitimate their children can sue for wrongful 
death in precisely the same circumstances as married 
fathers whose children were legitimate ab initio, the 
statutory classification does not discriminate against 
fathers as a class but instead distinguishes between 
fathers who have legitimated their children and those 
who have not. Such a classification is quite unlike 
those condemned in the Reed, Frontiero, and Stanton 
cases which were premised upon overbroad generalizations 
and excluded all members of one sex even though they 
were similarly situated with members of the other sex." 
Id. at 356-57 (emphasis added; footnote omitted)." 
a 
The application of Parham to the present case is clear. As 
in Parham, Michael Pessetto was not precluded from inheriting 
from his deceased son merely by virtue of his status of being 
a father rather than a mother of an illegitimate child. Instead, 
he had the ability to place himself in a position of heirship 
simply by taking one of the two means under Utah Code Annotated 
Sec. 75-2-109 to establish his rights of inheritance as a father. 
These requirements placed on a father of an illegitimate child 
reflect the biological reality that mothers and fathers of 
illegitimate children are not similarly situated and the 
concomitant fact that the legislature has valid reasons for 
imposing more stringent requirements of proof of paternity and 
commitment to a child on the father of an illegitimate child than 
on the mother. 
Even a casual reading of the cases of Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
US 24 8 (198 3) and Ellis v. Social Services Department of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1980) as cited by Appellant makes it apparent that neither of 
these cases support the Appellant's claim, 
" that a statute can discriminate on the basis of 
paternity, but once paternity is established, the mother 
and father stand on equal ground and no discrimination 
is allowable" (Quoted from Page 10 of Appellant's Brief) 
In fact there are no cases that support Appellant's proposition 
that once paternity is established the father and mother stand on 
equal ground, without regard to the other factual circumstances 
of the respective parents in relationship to the child. 
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The s u b j e c t s t a t u t e d o e s n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t M i c h a e l 
P e s s e t t o i n v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e IV S e c t i o n 1 of t h e Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n by d e n y i n g him a w i n d f a l l i n h e r i t a n c e from h i s 
d e c e a s e d s o n , u n d e r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y i n i t i a t e d by 
S t a t e a c t i o n , 
C. NO OTHER STATES WITH PROVISIONS IN THEIR STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS SIMILAR TO ARTICLE IV, SECTION I OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION HAVE INVALIDATED SIMILAR GENDER-BASED LEGISLATION. 
T h i s i s a c a s e of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n , and no o t h e r s t a t e h a s 
s p e c i f i c a l l l y a d d r e s s e d t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e in q u e s t i o n . Utah 
Code A n n o t a t e d S e c . 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 ( l ) ( b ) ( i i ) i s a p r o v i s i o n of t h e 
Uniform P r o b a t e Code which has been e n a c t e d in t h e same form in 
a t l e a s t t e n s t a t e s . S^£/_ e . g . , A l ^ a s ^ a S.t.a.jLi- S e c . 
1 3 . 1 1 . 0 4 5 (2 ) (B) ; A_r_iz^ Rey^ S j t a ^ Anru S e c . 1 4 - 2 109 ( 2 ) (b) ; 
C o l o . Rev. S t a t . S e c . 1 5 - l l - 1 0 9 ( b ) ( I I ) ; I d a h o Code S e c . 1 5 - 2 -
1 0 9 ( c ) ( 2 ) ; me Rev. S t a t . Ann, t i t . 18A, Sec 2 - 1 0 9 (2) ( i i i ) ; Mich. 
Comp. M w s . Ann. Sec 7 0 0. I l l (4) ( c ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . S e c . 3 0 -
2 3 0 9 ( 2 ) ( i i ) ; N.M. S t a t . Ann, s e c . 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 ( B ) ( 3 ) . T h i s s t a t u t o r y 
p r o v i s i o n h a s n e v e r been d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l in any of 
t h e s e s t a t e s . See e . g . M a t t e r of E s t a t e o:f S p e n c e r , 14 7 Mich . 
App. 6 2 6 , 383 N.W.2d 266 (1985) a p p l y i n g M i c h i g a n e q u i v a l e n t of 
Utah 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 . 
A l l of t h e g e n d e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a s e s a s c i t e d by t h e 
A p p e l l a n t s b r i e f a r e e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on t h e i r f a c t s from 
t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n a t i s s u e in t h i s c a s e . I t i s n o t t r u e 
t h a t o t h e r s t a t e s h a v e h e l d s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s t o b e 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . In each i n s t a n c e where o t h e r s t a t e s have he ld 
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statutes to be unconstitutional as being gender-based, the 
fathers have established emotional bonds with their children 
which have made them similarly situated with the mother- It is 
the emotional bond with the child and not his biological 
connection alone that gives the father an interest of the same 
constitutional stature as the mother. Matter of Adoption of Baby 
Boy Dy 742 P2d 1059, Okla. (1985), at 1065. 
POINT II. SECTION 75-2-109 (1)(b) ( i i) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY ANY GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION. 
A. RESPONDENT CONCURS THAT GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS OF 
STATE STATUTES BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT MUST PASS AN 
INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY. 
Appellant has correctly expressed the intermediate level 
of scrutiny rationale as adopted by the Courts that gender-based 
distinctions in state statutes "must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement 
of those objectives." Caban vs. Mohammed, 441 US 380, 388 
(1979); Craig vs. Boren 429 US 190,197 (1976). 
3. SECTION 75-2-109(1)(b) (ii) EASILY PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL 
MUSTER UNDER THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY. 
In the instant case, the cited statute clearly is 
substantially related to the important government interest in the 
maintenance of an accurate, fair, and efficient system for the 
disposition of property at death, and to the objectives of 
ensuring that an inheritance from an illegitimate child goes to a 
parent who has participated actively in the nurturing of the 
child, and of preventing a parent who has taken no active role in 
the birth or rearing of the child from reaping a financial 
windfall. 
The United States Supreme Court has frequently recognized 
that a state has an important and considerable interest in the 
maintenance of a fair and efficient method of intestate 
succession. See Lalli vs. Lalli, 439 US 259, 268 (1978); Trimble 
vs. Gordon, 430 US 762,771, (1977); Labme vs. Vincent 401 US 
532, 538 (1971). This Court interest is directly implicated in 
the issue of paternal inheritance from an illegitimate child 
because of the issues of proof, and the equities associated with 
a father's role in the child's life. Lall I vs. Laili supra. 
Moreover the Supreme Court has also recognized that a state has 
an important interest in distinguishing between natural fathers 
who participate in the raising of illegitimate children and 
fathers who make not effort to have a part in a child's life 
beyond what is required of them by court decree. See Caban vs. 
Mohammed, supra 441 US at 3 92: Lehr vs. Robertson, supra, 46 3 US 
at 266-67. In the instant case, at the conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court, recited in its declaration 
of findings of fact as follows: 
"I have already found that Mr. Pessetto did not 
refuse to support the child, I can only find, however, 
that he paid what he had to pay and was forced to pay by 
the Court. And he did absolutely nothing beyond that. 
A person, in my interpretation, who openly treats 
the child as his would try to find that child, would 
make an effort to pay support, would make an effort to 
visit the child, and would at least send cards or gifts 
to a last known address. Would inquire as to the 
condition and well being of the child at some point. And 
I find that Mr. Pessetto made no meaningful attempt to 
do any of those things." (Trial Transcript of Proceedings 
of October 16, 1987, pages 1 and 2. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly 
considered the issues presented in this case, it is clear from 
analogous cases that the Court would uphold the classification 
created by the subject statute as being one which is 
substantially related to the important governmental interests in 
rights of inheritance. In Caban vs. Mohanned, supra, for 
example, the court struck down the application of a New York law 
which always permitted the adoption of an illegitimate child 
without the approval of the natural father, but it is clear from 
the court's opinion that the decision rested on the need to give 
an acitve, loving natural father a voice in whether to permit an 
adoption. The facts in CLabari, showed the father of the 
illegitimate children had been identified as the father on the 
children's birth certificates, had lived with them for four 
years, and continued to support and visit with the children until 
the mother decided to marry another man and have him adopt the 
children. Because the statute made no distinction between 
fathers with a "substantial relationship" with a child and 
unmarried mothers who were similarly situated, the court held 
that it was unconstitutionally applied in the case before it. 
However, the court specifically added that the state could treat 
unmarried fathers and mothers differetly when they did in fact 
treat their children differently, 
"In those cases where the father has never come 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child, 
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the 
state from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing 
the adoption of that chLld."(441 US at 392) 
1 n
 k£JlJL V-Oi. E9.k*LLjLiLorix s>jiJDr,a., the Court applied this 
reasoning in the adoption context and squarely held that the 
quality of the relationship between a father and his illegitimate 
child could determine the extent of the father's right to receive 
notice of a pending adoption. The state law at issue permitted 
natural fathers to have a role in adoption decisions, but only if 
they filed a claim of paternity with the state's "putative father 
registry." The father in Lehr had not done so, but argued that 
he had substantially complied with the statute by acknowledging 
his paternity, attempting to support the child, and trying to 
visit her. The Court disagreed, holding that the state had a 
valid interest in creating specific means by which putative 
fathers could safeguard their parental rights, and that the 
distinctions drawn between such fathers and unrnnarried mothers 
were not unconstitutional. The Court concluded that 
"the existence or nonexistence of a substantial 
relationship between parent and child is a relevant 
criterion in evalutatmg. ...the rights of the parent..." 
(464 US at 266-67). 
With regard to how such a substantial relationship is shown the 
Court further stated: 
"The mother carries and bears the chLld, and in 
this sense her parental relationship is clear. The 
validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged 
by other measures." 
Id. at 260 n. 16 (quoting Caban vs. Mohammed, supra, 441 
US at 397, J. Stewart, dissenting). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has applied the same reasoning in 
upholding a statute requiring an unmarried father to file a claim 
of paternity within a certain period of time or lose the right to 
prevent the adopton of his child. In Ellis vs. Social Services 
Department of. tjie Church og Jesus Christ of Latter-Day SaintS/ 
supra/ the court rejected the father's claim based on Caban vs. 
Mohammedf supra that the statute provided unequal treatment of 
the unwed mother and father. Citing the language in Caban 
concerning the legitimate distinction between a caring father and 
one who never came forward to participate in the rearing of his 
child, the court concluded that the holding in £a.b«ani was 
distinguishable merely by virtue of the fact that the Utah 
statute gave an unmarried father the opportunity to protect his 
rights, whereas the one in Caban did not. 
Similarly, in W.E.J, vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles/ 100 
Cal App. 3d 303/ 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1980)/ the court upheld a 
Calfornia law which witheld from a biological father the power to 
veto an adoption unless he had married the mother or "receives 
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his 
natural child." Distinguishing Caban vs. Mohammed/ supra/ the 
court stated: 
"The California statute.... avoids the fault of 
discriminating between all unwed mothers and all unwed 
fathers. The satutory classification sets apart those 
biological fathers who have neither gone through an 
apparently valid marriage ceremony with the mother nor 
live with the child as a parent. 
Those biological fathers who are denied the veto 
power are easily distinguished from those who hold that 
power. Members of this class have neither expressed the 
interest which is implied in the marriage ceremony nor 
undertaken the care of the child in a common home.* 
To the extent that this classification is based 
upon gender, it is based upon an actual difference in 
situation. Whatever else may be said of an unwed 
mother, she is not a stranger to her child. A gender-
based claissification is not improper when men and women 
are not similarly situated. (See Schlesinqer v. Ballard 
419 US 498, 95 S. Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed. 2d 610.)" 
160 Cal. Rptr. at 869; accord In Interest of T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 
793 (Tex. 1980)f cert, denied, 450 US 1025 (1981); Collins vs. 
Division of Foster Care, 377 So. 2d 1266 (la. Ct. App. 1979); 
Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985). 
Thus, the case law clearly establishes that a state may 
validly discriminate between an unmarried father and an unmarried 
mother when the discrimination is based not simply on status 
alone, but rather is linked to the degree of interest and 
commitment expressed by the father. The subject statute in the 
instant case permits different treatment only when the father and 
mother are not actually in similar positions, and it is 
substantially related to an important governmental objective of 
providing for an orderly manner of inheritance from illegitimate 
children. Utah Code Annotated, 75-2-109(1)(b) ( i i ) in the case 
before the Court is not violative of equal protection. 
POINT III. SECTION 7 5-2- 109 (1) (b ) ( i i ) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION BY ALLOWING A MOTHER, BUT NOT A FATHER, TO INHERIT 
THROUGH THEIR CHILD, UNLESS THE FATHER HAS OPENLY TREATED THE 
CHILD AS HIS. 
As has been previously stated in the preceding portions of 
this brief, an unmarried father and an unmarried mother cannot 
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validly be characterized as being "similarly situated" for 
purposes of analyzing the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause. For the same reasons supporting this conclusion, it is 
also apparent that an unmarried father suffers no due process 
violation by virtue of a state statute which requires him to 
openly treat the child as his before he may inherit from the 
child, 
Mr. Pessetto has failed to identify how the due process 
clause protects the right alleged in this case in any manner 
beyond that as alleged in his equal protection arguments. The 
cases cited by the Appellant in his due process claim all involve 
actions against the federal government, to which the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not apply, and thus the argument rests upon the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment in lieu of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Caiiiano vs^ Goldfarb, 430 US 199 (1977); Weinberger vs^ _ 
Wissenfeld, 420 US 636 (1975); Califlano vs. Webster, 440 US 313 
(19 77); Califano vs^ Wescott, 443 US 76 (1979). See Parham vs. 
Hughes,supra, 441 US at 1749, to the effect that the Due 
Process Clause is not implicated by statute setting forth which 
persons could bring wrongful death action on behalf of an 
illegitimate child. 
However, even assuming that the Appellant could point to 
some recognized property or liberty interest, it is manifestly 
clear that such an interest is adequately protected by the 
subject statute 75-2-109. The numerous cases previously cited in 
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this brief indicate that an unmarried father may be treated 
differently from an unmarried mother so long as he is not 
completely precluded from enjoying rights shared with the 
unmarried mother. In Lehr vs. Robertson, supra, which in part 
involved an alleged deprivation of a liberty interest of a 
natural father in the adoption context, the court: specifically 
stressed that the liberty interest in the family relationship 
rises to a protected level only when the father "demonstrates a 
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 
'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child1". 
463 US at 261 (quoting Caban vs. Mohammed, supra, 441 US at 392). 
The Court further found that "the mere existence of a biological 
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection" under 
the due process clause. Id. 
Because of Mr. Pessetto's inattention and lack of caring 
towards his son prevented him from creating a protectible liberty 
interest and prevented his qualification as an heir of the 
decedent, he cannot now claim that any due process violation has 
occurred. 
POINT IV. SECTION 75-2-109(1) (b) (l l) OF THE SUBJECT UTAH STATUTE 
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AND IT DOES MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUION. 
The language of Sub-paragraph (n) of the subject statute 
requiring a father to have "openly treated the child as his own" 
in addition to "not refuse to support the child" is not vague 
language. The Trial Judge stated from the bench as follows in 
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his decision at the conclusion of the October 16, 1987, trial: 
"The remaining issue of fact is whether he openly 
treated the child as his child. Apparently there is no 
help in the case law as to what that phrase means, so we 
look to just the common English language and terms that 
are used there. It appears to me that in some way he 
must have tried to act like a parent to that child at 
some point. 
A person, in my interpretation, who openly treats the 
child was his would try to find that child, would make an 
effort to pay support, would make an effort to visit the 
child, would at least send cards or gifts to a last known 
address. Would inquire as to the condition and well 
being of the child at some point." (Trial Transcript 
of Proceeding of October 16, 1987, pages 1 and 2.) 
The Trial judge had no difficulty in immediately determining 
the meaning of "openly treat as his own" by the common usage 
approach of such term in the English language. The designation 
of a phrase that is simple and understandable in every day usage 
as "vague" does not make it vague. The term "openly treat as his 
own" and variations thereof are in common usage among most of us 
in our daily conversations about family life and the 
relationships exhibited between parent and child. 
Most of us could agree by reason of our common sense and 
life experiences as a child and parent as to the objective 
elements of being "openly treat as his own" without the 
necessity of a definition. English speaking people in our 
American culture have a common understanding of such expressions, 
and our understanding would include the same basic objective 
standards as stated by the Trial Judge in his quoted opinion. 
Men of common intelligence would not have to guess as to the 
meaning of "openly treat as his own" in reference to a 
parent child relationship. Without difficulty, such a phrase is 
commonly understood by all English speaking people in the culture 
of our state so as not to cause deprivation of rights or property. 
POINT V. IT IS A MAXIM OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THAT A COURT 
MUST PRESUME A STATUTE TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL AND AVOID 
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES WHENEVER POSSIBLE. 
It is a well-established maxim of statutory construction 
that a court must presume a statute to be constitutional, and 
must construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmities 
whenever possible. State vs. Lmdquist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1983). Accordingly, it is the duty of a court to effectuate the 
intent of the legislature whenever possible, State vs. Casarez, 
656. P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), and it must investigate and discover 
any reasonable avenues by which the statute can be upheld. Trade 
Commission vs. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc.,21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 
958 (Utah 1968). It is not within the province of the court to 
take into consideration every conceivable hypothetical situation 
in determining the constitutionality of statutes. As the courts 
have often demonstrated in gender discrimination cases involving 
unmarried fathers and mothers, the possibility that the statute 
might in some hypothetical case unconstitutionally favor an 
unmarried mother who may neglect or abandon her child is no basis 
for striking down the statute. In this case, it is beyond 
question that the mother did openly treat the deceased as her 
child from birth until death, while the Appellant did not. See 
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Parham vs. Hughes, supra; Lehr vs. Robertson, sjj£Jraj_ Ellis Vs. 
Social Services Department of, the Church oJf Jesus Christ of. 
Latter Day Saints, supra; W.E.J, vs. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles, iLU£JLaj_ iH iB.t:£..r£.>st: of_ T. E.T., §.u&L<LL ££iiJLILS vs. 
Division of Foster Care, supra; Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D, 
supra (all upholding statutes which assumed non-abandonment by 
the mother). 
The Appellant bears the heavy burden of proving that the 
subject statute is unconstitutional. Ellis vs. Social Services 
Department of Chruch of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Supra. 
Any doubts must be resolved m favor of the constitutionality of 
the statute, and the statute cannot be declared unconstitutional 
unless it is found to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. Stone vs. 
Department of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1977) 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the Judgment and 
Decree of Judge David E. Roth of the Trial Court, dated March 8, 
1988, be affirmed, declaring that 75-2-109, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as Amended is a constitutional statute of the State of 
Utah, and that Joleen L. Scheller, as mother of William "Billy 
Joe" Scheller, deceased, is the sole heir at law to inherit from 
said child; and that Michael Pessetto, father of said child shall 
not inherit. 
Attorney dent 
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Examination (By Mr. Kunz) 
1 A. I don't remember. 
2 I MR. SKEEN: Let me just interject. Rather than 
3 objecting to every question, I'm going to make a continuing 
4 objection to relevance at this point. 
5 MR. KUNZ: Off the record just a second. 
6 MR. SKEEN: Maybe we could resolve it. 
7 MR. KUNZ: Off the record for a second. 
8 (There was a discussion held off the record.) 
9 Q. BY MR. KUNZ: When was your first — do you have any 
10 recollection of any conversation with her between the time 
11 that you found out she was pregnant and the child was born? 
12 A. I don't remember. 
13 Q. Okay. Do you have any recollection of any 
14 conversations with her father or mother between the time that 
15 you knew she was pregnant and the child was born? 
16 A. I don't remember. 
17 Q. Okay. Do you know that the child was born on 
18 August 10th, 1981; do you know that? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 f Q. Did you at any time during his lifetime see Billy Joe 
21 Scheller? 
22 A. I never knew where he was at. 
23 Q. You're not answering my question. Did you at any 
24 time during his lifetime see Billy Joe Scheller? 
25 A. How could I when I didn't know where he was at? 
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Examination (By Mr. Kunz) 
1 I MR. SKEEN: It just calls for a yes or no. 
2 I MR. KUNZ: You need to instruct him. That's a 
3 straightforward question. 
4 MR. SKEEN: I've instructed him, Counsel. I 
5 instructed him. 
6 It takes a yes or no. Answer yes or no. 
7 |A. NO. 
8 MR. SKEEN: If he wants to know beyond that he'll ask 
9 you. 
10 J THE WITNESS: Okay. 
11 | / Q. BY MR. KUNZ: Did you at any time after this child 
12 was born ever request to see or visit the child? 
13 JA. NO. 
14 Q. Did you at any time after the payment of the $1250 
15 that was paid to the state pay any $100 per month payments 
16 through the Clerk of the Court for the support of the child? 
17 A. I called and asked why I wasn't making support 
18 payments anymore and they looked and said nobody's requesting 
19 anything, we cannot give you any information. 
20 Q. Did you receive a copy of the order that was mailed 
21 to you setting forth your child support payments? 
22 A. No, not to my recollect. 
23 Q. I'll show you what we'll mark as Petitioner's 
24 Exhibit 1 which purports to be an order from the Second 
25 Judicial District Court of Weber County dated September 19th, 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
that the matter be placed on the trial calendar for 
determination. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly tor trial at 
9:30 a.m., October 16, 1987, pursuant to notice to the parties, 
before the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court, sitting without jury. Petitioner, Joleen L. Scheller, 
appeared in person and was represented by her counsel, Paul T. 
Kunz, and the Objecting Party, Michael Pessetto, appeared in 
person, and was represented by his counsel, James E. Morton and 
Randall L. Skeen, and the Court having heard the testimony of 
both the Petitioner and the Objecting Party, and the testimony of 
the repective witnesses as called by each party, and having heard 
the oral arguments of the respective Counsel, and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The respective Counsel stipulated to the Court that the 
issues of fact and matters of law to be determined at trial were 
as follows: 
a. For the purposes of inheritance by intestate 
succession from William "Billy Joe" Scheller, did Michael 
Pessetto establish the parent and child relationship with William 
"Billy Joe" Scheller within the meaning of 75-2-109(1)(b)(ii), 
U^ tah Code Annotated 195 3, as Amended, by openly treating said 
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named child as his and by not refusing to support said child both 
as required by the provisions of said cited statute? 
b. Is 75-2-109(l)(b)( ii) of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code an unconstitutional and sex discriminating statute as 
claimed by the Objecting Party, Michael Pessetto? 
2. The Petitioner and Objecting Party through their 
respective counsel thereafter stipulated to the Court to proceed 
and present their evidence in regard to issue l.a. above, and 
that issue l.b. as to the constitutionality of the cited statute 
would thereafter be presented to the Court through written 
briefs, and by oral arguments, if requested. 
3. Objecting Party, Michael Pessetto, did not refuse to 
support the minor child, William "Billy Joe" Scheller, during 
his lifetime, Michael Pessetto paid what support he had to pay 
and was forced to pay by Court Order, and he did absolutely 
nothing beyond that. 
4. Considering all the evidence, the Court finds that 
Michael Petssetto did not openly treat William "Billy Joe" 
Scheller, deceased, as his child during his lifetime. That the 
excuse of Michael Pessetto that he could not find the location of 
the mother of the child is a hollow excuse. The Court further 
finds that Michael Pessetto made no meaningful effort to find the 
mother and the named child, now deceased. 
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5. Although Michael Pessetto and the mother of the deceased 
child were present in Court at the time of the paternity hearing, 
on May 23rd and May 24, 1983, that Michael Pessetto made no 
effort at that time to ask where he could find the child, how the 
child was, or how he could visit the child. 
6. The Court finds that in order for a person to openly 
treat a child as his, he would try to find that child; he would 
make an effort to pay support; he would make an effort to visit 
the child; he would at least send cards or gifts to a last known 
address; and he would inquire as to the condition and wellbeing 
of the child at some point. Michael Pessetto made no meaningful 
attempt to do any of those things. 
7. The Court specifically finds that 75-2-109 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code requires more than an acknowledgement of 
paternity following a trial where a person is determined to be 
the father of a child. Michael Pessetto did acknowledge the 
child as his following a paternity hearing. The cited statute 
requires more than acknowledgment. Michael Pessetto did not, in 
the opinion of the Court, openly treat the child as his. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
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1 . T h a t u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 7JLz 2 z l 9.1 HI-a Jh ^ode 
A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a s A m e n d e d , M i c h a e l P e s s e t t o s may n o t i n h e r i t 
f r o m t h e e s t a t e o f h i s d e c e a s e d c h i l d , W i l l i a m " B i l l y J o e " 
S c h e l l e r , and J o l e e n L. S c h e l l e r i s t h e s o l e h e i r a t l aw of s a i d 
d e c e a s e d c h i l d , u n l e s s C o u n s e l f o r t h e O b j e c t i n g P a r t y h e r e a f t e r 
c o n v i n c e s t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e c i t e d U t a h s t a t u t e i s 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 
2 . C o u n s e l f o r t h e O b j e c t i n g P a r t y , M i c h a e l P e s s e t t o , i s 
g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t , w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s h e r e o f , a 
B r i e f t o t h e C o u r t a s t o t h e i r c l a i m o f u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f 
7 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a s Amended . P e t i t i o n e r s h a l l 
h a v e t w e n t y d a y s t h e r e a f t e r t o f i l e a R e s p o n s e B r i e f , a n d t h e 
O b j e c t i n g P a r t y s h a l l h a v e t e n d a y s t h e r e a f t e r t o f i l e a R e p l y 
B r i e f . O r a l a r g u m e n t s may b e r e q u e s t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e 
p r o v i s i o n s of C o u r t R u l e 2 . 8 . 
3 . I f t h e C o u r t i s p e r s u a d e d t h a t t h e c i t e d Utah s t a t u t e i s 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e c a s e w i l l g o f o r w a r d f r o m t h e r e . I f t h e 
C o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e c i t e d U t a h s t a t u t e i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , 
t h e C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law o f t h e p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h 1. s h a l l 
c o n s t i t u t e t h e r u l i n g f o r an O r d e r and j u d g m e n t of t h e C o u r t . 
4 . F o r a p p e a l p u r p o s e s , t h e r e w i l l b e no f i n a l j u d g m e n t 
u n t i l t h e C o u r t h a s e n t e r e d i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o t t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e p r e s e n t e d . 
DATED t h i s ^ / day o f MatfJU^Cnk 1 9 8 7 . 
DAVID E. ROTH 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Petition for Formal 
Determination of Heirs, to JAMES E. MORTON and RANDALL L. SKEEN, 
Attorneys at Law, HATCH, MORTON, & SKEEN, 1245 Brickyard Road, 
Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, by United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, this - f~J day of October, 1987. 
Secretary 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
WILLIAM "BILLY JOE" SHELLER, 
DECEASED 
Case No. 16434 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter cane 
on for hearina before the Hon. DAVID E. ROTH, Judae of the 
above entitled Court, on October 16, 1987. 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedinas were had, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s ; 
PAUL T . KUNZ, E S O . , 
Attorney for Petitioner 
JAMES E. MORTON, ESQ., 
RANDALL R. SKEEN, ESO., 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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October 16, 198 Estate of Billy Joe Sche .er 
THE COURT: I am prepared to make findings of 
Fact, and then it will be up to the attorneys to convince 
me whether or not the statute is Constitutional, 
I have already found that Mr. Pessetto did not refuse 
to support the child. I can only find, however, that he 
paid what he had to pay and was forced to pay by the Court. 
And he did absolutely nothing beyond that. 
The remaining issue of fact is whether he openly treatedi 
the child as his child. Apparently there is no help in 
the case law as to what that phrase means, so we look to 
just the common English language and terms that are used 
there. It appears to me that in some way he must have tried 
to act like a parent to that child at some point. 
After having heard all the evidence, I find that he 
has not done that. His excuse is that he could not find the 
mother or the child. I find that to be a hollow excuse. 
I find that he made no meaningful effort to find the mother 
and the child. I don't believe it would have been necessarv 
to hire a private investigator or an attorney. Pt least for 
part of the time the Schellers were living in Onden, and she 
had a listed telephone. That there were contacts made at 
the time of the paternity. He made no effort at that 
time to ask where they were, how the child was, where he 
could find the child, how he could visit the child. 
A person, in my interpretation, vho openly treats the 
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child was his would try to find that child, would make an 
effort to pay support, would make an effort to visit the 
child, would at least send cards or gifts to a last known 
address. Would inquire as to the condition and well beinq 
of the child at some point. And I find that Mr. Pessetto 
made no meaninqful attempt to do any of those thinqs. 
I find specifically that this statute requires more 
than an acknowledqement of paternity following a trial where 
you are determined to be the father. The evidence would 
support a finding that he did, followina that, acknowledge 
that this was his child. It is curious, though, that he 
would acknowledge that this was his child v/hile not acknowledging 
having sexual intercourse with the child*s mother. 
If the statute required only an acknowledaement, I 
think that would be the wordina of the statute. It does not 
say that. It requires somethinq more than that. And I 
have already found Mr, Pessetto did not in my opinion openly 
treat the child as his. 
Based on that finding, it will be the Judament of the 
Court that he nay not interit from this child unless his 
attorneys can convince me that this statute is unconsitutiona." 
If they persuade me that's the case, we v7ill ao from there. 
IIR. HORTOII: How would the Court like to address 
that? Does the Court want to make a Findina we can take it 
up as constitutional, or would the Court prefer briefs? 
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THE COURT: Submit your authorities similar to the 
way you do it under 2.8. Give Mr. Kunz an opportunity to 
respond. Regardless of what my decision on that is, I 
suspect it is something you will want to take up. 
You want to have oral argument? I will leave it up to 
you to request it if you want. 
MR. MORTON: I am not necessarily certain that 
we would need oral arqument. May I have a timetable? May 
we have 30 days to submit a brief, after which a response 
period; something like that? 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. KUNZ: Your Honor, do you want the Findinas 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared, except as to the 
Constitutional question before that date, and signed, or 
do you want to hold it? 
THE COURT: I think that distills it down to one 
issue remainincr at this level anyway. Do it that way. 
MR. KUNZ: Do it that way and reserve that item 
as being open? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SKEEN: However, just to clarify this, there 
will be no final Judament until the determination is made 
relative to the Constitutional issue, for appeal purposes? 
THE COURT: Thatfs right. 
MR. SKEEN: Thank you. 
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MR. MORTON: Your Honor, with reqard to oral 
argument, I hate to waive it at this time. Perhaps I could 
reserve it. 
THE COURT: Follow rule 2.8. It provides that you 
can request it if you like. 
MR. MORTON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: And I can tell you right now if either 
party requests oral argument, you can have it. 
MR. MORTON: 30 days on my brief? 
MR. KUNZ: That's fine with me. 
THE COURT: You can have 30 days. And ten days 
enouqh to respond? That's generally what you have under 2.8. 
Do you need more than that? 
MR. KUNZ: I think in this instance if he is aoina 
to take 30, maybe I better have 15 anyway, 15 or 20. 
THE COURT Twenty, and then ten days for response 
from you. 
MR. MORTON: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: Court is in recess. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) | 
) ss. 
County of Weber) I 
I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of 
the official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and a 
competent machine shorthand writer. 
That on October 16, 1987, I reported in machine shorthand 
the proceedinas had in the hereinbefore entitled matter. 
to 
4, 
of 
in 
of 
That thereafter, I reduced my machine shorthand notes 
typewriting, and the foreqoina transcript, pages 1 through 
inclusive, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript 
the said machine shorthand notes taken by me on said date 
said matter. i 
WHEREUPON, I have hereunto set my hand this 19th day 
October, 1987. 
—> 
• Jffn/? X y y ^ / ^ 
J>^s N; JonW 
/3fficial Court Reporter. 
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